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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL APPORTIONMENT
OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA
I. INTRODUCTION
Midland County, Texas, has a population of about seventy thousand.
The general governing body of the county is the Commissioner's Court,
composed of five members. One, the County Judge, is elected at large
and votes only to break a tie. The other four members are chosen from
single member districts.' Virtually all of the county's only urban center,
the city of Midland, is placed in one district.
Voter A, who lives in Midland, votes along with 67,905 others to
elect one member of the Court. Voters B, C, and D who live in the
country vote with only 851, 413, and 827 others, respectively, to elect
their representatives to the Court.2 The Court's powers embrace both
the rural and urban areas. It appoints numerous minor county officials,
lets contracts, builds roads and bridges, administers the county welfare
plan, sets the county tax rate, and serves as a board of equalization. 3
Is Voter A's situation with respect to his County Commissioner's
Court any different than if his vote for a member of the State House of
Representatives were similarly debased by unequal districts? The United
States Supreme Court recently said "no." '4 The Court held that "the
Constitution imposes one ground rule for the development of local govern-
ment: a requirement that units with general governmental powers over
an entire geographic area not be apportioned among single member dis-
tricts of substantially unequal population."5
The decision was not reached without some difficulty and leaves
many questions unanswered. It's impact upon the structure of local
government in Montana depends upon a number of factors. The govern-
ing bodies under Montana law are not perfectly analogous to the Com-
missioner's Court in Texas. To understand what difference this might
make, we must start with a general review of apportionment law.
II. INTO THE THICKET
Few decisions of the Supreme Court dealing with the conduct of
American politics have had as immediate an impact as Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186 (1962), and the reapportionment cases which followed in
'Avery v. Midland County, Texas, 88 S. Ct., 1114 (1968).
21d. at 1116.
'Interpretive Commentary, Vernon's Annotated Texas Constitution, Art. V, See. 18
(1955).
'Avery v. Midland County Texas, supra, note 1.
Id. at 1121.
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1964.6 Few have so quickly reversed an accepted aspect of the American
political structure.
Until the eve of Baker v. Carr, the Supreme Court had held, and
the legal and political community accepted the fact that the imbalance
of malapportionment was beyond the power of the Court to correct. It
was generally felt that voters did not have proper standing to sue, that
the courts were without power to afford a remedy, and that the whole
matter was a political question which the Court had no business con-
sidering.
Most of these arguments stemmed from the case of Colegrove v. Green,
328 U.S. 549 (1946), in which Justice Frankfurter cautioned that "courts
ought not to enter this political thicket," and that the best the Court
could do would be to declare the existing system invalid. 7 The Court in
Colegrove was badly split on the issues of standing, political question,
and the ability of the Court to grant equity, but Justice Frankfurter's
warning was heeded for another sixteen years, though it was in fact not
the holding of a majority of the Court.8
Whatever we may think of the advisability of "entering the
thicket," the argument is now a matter of history. In 1960 the Court's
self-imposed restraint began to break down. In Gornillion v. Lightfoot,
364 U.S. 339 (1960), a unanimous Court gave Negro voters standing to
challenge a legislative districting which created a racial gerrymander. The
decision was based on the Fifteenth Amendment.
Baker v. Carr in 1962 disposed of the remaining restrictions on the
Court's jurisdiction. The Court granted standing, and the six-man major-
ity held that debasement of voting power was a justiciable question under
the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendement. The majority
found a violation of the Fourteenth Amendment and remanded the case
to a three-judge federal court to determine the remedy.9
Baker involved a state house of representatives. 10 Later decisions
extended the remedy to congressional districts," state senates,' 2 and state
primary elections. 12  The constitutional basis and the emphasis of the
decisions varied. The Court practiced some constitutional gymnastics
as it was presented with various entrenched interests and political
structures in the different states and at varying levels of our federal
GWaldon, Ellis L., ''100 Years of Apportionment in Montana," 28 MONT. L. REV. 4
(1966).
7Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1964).
8Seven Justices participated. A four-three majority held that there was no basis for
equity in that case, but a four-three alignment held that there would be in proper
cases. The majority did not support Frankfurter in holding that it was a non-
justiciable political question.
OBaker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 237 (1962).
"
0The Tennessee General Assembly.
uWesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1 (1964).
12Reynolds v. Simms, 377 U.S. 533 (1964).
[Vol. 30
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system. These will be discussed in detail later, for they bear directly
on the extension of this constitutional right into the area of local govern-
ment. The important point, however, is that the Court has steadfastly
adhered to the principle that one man-one vote means what it says.
III. DOES IT REALLY MATTER?
The Supreme made a major reversal of its own policy when it
entered the thicket of legislative apportionment. An activist Court, al-
ready under fire in other areas, opened itself to further criticism which
led to official state protests13 and an attempt in Congress to overrule
the decisions.1
4
Was the debasement of voting rights so serious a problem that it
merited such an all-out effort by the Court? The question may now be
somewhat moot. Frankfurther's dissent in Baker1" repeated his majority
opinion in Cologrove.'6 He warned again against judicial entanglement by
granting illusory relief for a hypothetical claim which rests on abstract
assumptions.
These arguments will not reverse the course of judicial action.
However, the concept of American politics which led to judicial inter-
vention still shapes the future extension of the doctrine of the one man-
one vote.
Is there a real harm from the debasement of voting rights? The
answer involves questions of political theory, economics, racial discrimi-
nation, and practical politics.
Even in pure theory, the answer is difficult. The proposition that
a state senator "represents" his constituency suggests that equal votes
are important. However, American political theory has never really
decided whether a senator exercises his own best judgment or merely
reflects the collective feelings of his constituency. In practice it is
probably something of both-the kind of ambiguity which lends credence
to Frankfurther's dissent in Baker.
However, in a very practical sense, there are four conflicts in
American politics which are often reflected in the geography of a dis-
tricting plan. In general terms, the four are urban v. rural, white v.
black, property v. consumer interests, and republican v. democrat. Where
a districting plan gives relatively more votes to one area that another,
and to whatever extent a representative identifies directly with his con-
"Montana's reaction is typical. Senate Joint Resolution No. 5, Laws of Montana 1965,
999, called for an amendment to provide that one house of a state legislature could
be based on factors other than population.
"The Dirksen Amendment in Congress is discussed in Hanson, The Political Thicket,
Prentice-Hall, 1966, P.92-101.
'
5Supra.
"Supra.
1968]
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stituency, one of these opposing interests is given more political power
than the other.
The geographical relationship between urban and rural is obvious.
The association of the others is not so obvious or universal, but is con-
sistent enough to cause problems in many states. Negroes, democrats and
consumers tend to be concentrated in urban areas. Vhites, republicans
and property interests tend to group together in the suburbs or less
populous areas. A districting plan which improperly emphasizes popu-
lation in particular areas may reflect the imbalance in the governing
body which the districts constitute.
Reapportionment is working. The most apparent example is Negro
representation. The other interests are not as clearly identifiable, but
there is little doubt that they will be felt in the long run. The future
of reapportionment may prove Frankfurter to be wrong. The courts
have been effective in shaping remedies. The result is that governing
bodies, when apportioned properly, will better reflect the interests they
represent.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENTS
The geographical association of conflicting interests which led the
Supreme Court into the area of legislative apportionment can be just
as real for local governing bodies as state legislatures. However, blanket
extension of the doctrine into the area is not necessarily justified by
the geographical imbalance. The constitutional or statutory structure of
a particular governing body may be such that the geographical separation
of interests is not reflected in the board itself. Further, the extension
of the apportionment doctrine requires some re-examination of the
established constitutional requirements for legislative apportionment.
What are these requirements? Exact mathematical equality of dis-
tricts is not required. 17 Certain other criteria, if adhered to, make
mathematical exactness impossible. Among these are respect for existing
county lines, compactness and contiguity. The Court has said that these
criteria will not be permitted to excuse substantial departures from
equality of population,' 8 but they can often be considered without creat-
ing substantial disparities.
How much difference in the population of districts will be permitted?
The Court has never established an exact standard, but it has relied on
two measurements of the disparity. One is the ration between the popu-
lation of largest and smallest district. 19 The second is the percentage
of the population which could elect a majority of the assembly.20 The
'
7Reynolds, supra at 583.
"Lucas v. Colorado General Assembly, 377 U.S. 713 (1964).
"Reynolds, supra.
2DId.
[Vol. 30
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apportionment schemes which have been upheld suggest that a ratio of
1.20 to one and a percentage close to fifty percent will be sufficient for
state legislative apportionment. The allowable departures will depend on
local circumstances.
21
It must be noted that the imbalances of representation, at which
reapportionment has been aimed, do not arise where the governing body
is elected at large. In such a case, any particular representative does
not have an obligation to a specific geographical group.
The American political system works through a composite of elected
governing bodies. They can be arranged roughly in a hierarchy which arises
out of the federal system; some were created by the federal Constitution,
some by state constitutions, others by state statute or local ordinance
or city charter. There is an equal variety in the scope of their powers,
types of apportionment and responsibility for apportionment.
The United States House of Representatives is malapportioned. How-
ever, the situation arises out of the Constitution itself.22 The Supreme
Court has brushed aside arguments that state legislatures under state
contitutional provisions could have a similar malapportionment on analogy
to the federal government. 23 This seems to indicate that the Court will
have little sympathy for any apportionment of any body below the
federal level, regardless of the source of the unit's power, where it results
in substantial malapportionment. One man-one vote seems to be re-
quired across the spectrum of American politics, without regard to
history.
V. IS LOCAL GOVERNMENT DIFFERENT?
The United States Supreme Court faced the issue of the apportion-
ment of local government for the first time in Avery v. Midland County,
Texas, 88 S. Ct., 1114 (1968).24 A five-to-three majority held "that the
Constitution permits no substantial variation from equal population in
drawing districts for units of local government.' '25 The holding was
again based on the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
The majority reasoned that the Fourteenth Amendment applies to
"the exercise of state power however manifested.' '26 Thus, even where
the malapportionment is created by local ordinances or the action of the
local board itself, as an agent of the state, it is state action subject to
the Fourteenth Amendment.
"WALDRON, ELLIS L., The Constitutional Obligation to Reapportion, MONTANA Busi-
NESS QUARTERLY, 96-105 (1965).
2U.S. CONST., Art. I, § 2.
2Reynolds, supra at 573.
2
'For holdings of state and federal courts applying the principles of Reynolds v. Simms
to local government, seeAvery, supra at 1117.
'Avery, supra at 1120.
wId. at 1117.
1968]
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The Court noted that the powers exercised by the board were rele-
vant to the requirement that it be apportioned according to population. 27
It had been argued that the Commissioner's Court had few legislative
functions, and that it was really more executive or judicial.28 Such
arguments, if accepted, could substantially reduce the impact of the
population requirement on local government. Units of local government
play a unique but often not strictly legislative role. In a very real
sense, one body may exercise all three powers in about equal proportions.
The Court rejected this argument, however, stating that equal population
of districts was required wherever the governing board has "general
governmental powers over the entire geographical area served by the
body. "29
It was further urged that the work of the Commission's Court
related more to the rural areas than the urban areas, and as a result
the emphasis or rural representation was justified.30 The Court held
that while the Commissioner's Court may in fact deal more extensively
with rural areas, their powers related extensively to both groups. 30 The
Court did not rule on the situation where the powers as well as what
is actually done relate more to the rural than the urban area. The
majority placed heavy emphasis on the power of the Commissioners to
determine the county tax rate.31
Finally, the majority pointed out that the decision was not in-
tended to prescribe one form for local government. They suggested that
cities and counties were free to devise particular bodies to meet special
circumstances, as long as their districts properly reflect population. 32
There were three dissents. Justice Harlan reiterated his dissent
in Reynolds,3 3 asserting that apportionment was a political question be-
yond the cognizance of the Court. Justice Fortas adhered to the principles
of the Reynolds decision, but felt that the Court should have waited to
see the results of the redistricting ordered by the Texas Supreme Court.34
Justice Stewart, like Justice Harlan, felt that the complexity of state
and local apportionment was beyond the powers of the Court.35
On the merits, the dissenting Justices disagreed with the majority
reasoning in several respects. They saw a distinction between the case
DId. at 1120.
2Id. at 1119.
2Id. at 1120.
8'Id.
wId.
82Id.
"Reynolds, supra at 1395.
"'The Texas Supreme Court had held that the present scheme was unconstitutional
and had remanded, saying that population, number of qualified voters, land areas,
miles of county roads and taxable values could be considered in the new plan. Avery
v. Midland County, Texas, 406 S. W. 2d, 919 (1965).
"Avery, supra at 1133.
[Vol. 30
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of state legislatures and local governments in the nature of the powers
that they exercise. Reynolds was based on the proposition that every
citizen stands in the same relation to the state legislature. Justice Fortas
points out that the same is not true of all units of local governments. 36
Their powers arc limited and often strike one group of citizens more
than others. The dissents would require equal population districts only
where the powers of the body in question affect the districts equally.
The action of a particular board may "have only slight impact on some
of [its] constituents and a vast and direct impact on others. '" 37 The
dissents contend that the majority's extension of the Reynolds doctrine
to "units of local government with general responsibility and power for
local affairs" grossly oversimplifies the problem. 38 Justice Fortas con-
tends that such blanket extension of the Reynolds doctrine "denies, does
not implement-substantive equality of voting rights. "39
Even taking the reasoning of the majority only, it is obvious that
the requirement of population equity cannot be applied flatly to all
units of local government. The question of the powers exercised was of
concern to the majority, and could be such that a population standard
is inappropriate.
VI. APPORTIONMENT OF LOCAL GOVERNMENT IN MONTANA
From the preceding discussion, we can state the following general
rules about the apportionment of local government. The equal protection
clause of the Fourteenth Amendment requires that members of elective
bodies of state and local government be chosen from districts of equal
population. Exact mathematical equality will not be required. Factors
other than population may be considered only to the extent that the
resulting apportionment conforms to the equal population requirement.
The equal population rule is inapplicable where members are elected at-
large. It may be modified where the powers which the body can exercise
affect one area more than another.
Under Montana law, there are two elective bodies in local govern-
ment which exercise sufficient powers to fall within the purview of
the apportionment requirements. They are -the boards of county com-
missioners and city councils. Each is structured differently, and thus
each is differently affected by the requirements of apportionment. Each
will be considered separately, with emphasis on the situation in Missoula
County and the City of Missoula for purposes of illustration. Most of
what is said will apply equally to the other Montana counties.
"Id. at 1127.
'Id. at 1128.
1Id. at 1124.
'Id. at 1132.
1968]
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The Board of County Commissioners
In Montana, county commissioners are elected at large.40 This, stand-
ing alone, would make the apportionment requirements inapplicable.
However, the Montana Constitution also provides that each county is to
be divided into three districts, and, though elected at large, one member
must reside in each of the three districts. 41 This partial use of districts
opens the question of apportionment. The Avery case does not control,
however, because it dealt with election districts, not residence districts.
It could be argued that this residence requirement is part of an
individual voter's rights to equal representation and is protected by
the Fourteenth Amendment from debasement by unequal districts. The
United States Supreme Court has not spoken directly on this question,
but it has sustained a similar plan in the case of a city council with
both at-large and district-elected members. 42 It would appear that absent
clarification by the Supreme Court, the residence provision in the Mon-
tant Constitution does not raise a federal question, even if the populations
of the districts are not equal.
If necessary, unequal districts might be defended on the grounds
that the inequality of population reflects an inequality in the powers
which the county commissioners may exercise. The Avery case, as dis-
cussed above, left this question unsettled, but indicated that it might
prevail under proper circumstances. The decision would require an
exhaustive classification of the powers of the board. It is the powers
which can be exercised, not those which are exercised in practice, which
are controlling.
Even though the apportionment of boards of county commissioners
may not be subject to question under the Fourteenth Amendment, it
would appear that the Montana Constitution requires that the three dis-
tricts be of equal population. Article XVI, Section 4, provides that the
board may change the boundaries of the districts "to equalize population
and area." The mandate for districts of equal population seems clear.
The apportionment of the districts in Missoula County seems to
satisfy even the Montana requirement. The three districts are roughly
pie-shaped so that each district includes a portion of the urban area
in the City of Missoula. Any county which includes all its urban center
in one district is probably violating the Montana Constitution, but their
plan would not seem to violate federal requirements.
The City Council
City councils under Montana law would be subject to the apportion-
ment requirements for local government stated in Avery. The aldermen
40MONT. CONST., Art. XVI, § 4.
"Id.
'
2Dusch v. Davis, 87 S. Ct. 1554 (1967).
[Vol. 30
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are elected from wards which are determined by the city council. 43
Though provision for two aldermen from each ward complicates the
theories of representation, the district identity which characterizes the
equal apportionment requirements is still present.
In some ways, a city council would be more readily subject to
equal population requirements than the Commissioner's Court in Avery.
The city council serves a more homogeneous area than does a body like
the county commissioners. A city council is more analogous to a state
legislature and the Reynolds standard, in that each resident stands in
the same relation to a city council, much as they do to a state legis-
lature.
Whatever malapportionment exists, it results not from the state
statutes, but from the action of the city councils, which determine the
boundaries of the wards.44 However, they are acting as agents under
the authority of the state, and there is clearly state action within the
Fourteenth Amendment.
The city councils under Montana law are also under a statutory duty
to provide for wards of equal population. R.C.M. 1947, 11-707, provides
that the city council "must divide the city or town into wards, having
regard to population so as to make them as nearly equal as possible."
The apportionment of Missoula's city council is probably unconsti-
tutional under the Fourteenth Amendment and seems to violate the pro-
visions of state statute. It cannot be stated positively because of a
problem in measurement. The United States Bureau of Census does not
collect population figures by precincts or wards. Thus, we have no
authoritative population figures for the districts in question. For the
purposes of this paper, estimates of population by precinct in the City
of Missoula have been prepared by analogy to the registered vote. The
total registered vote in Missoula County for the primary election of
June 4, 1968, 4 5 was compared to a 1966 estimate of the population for
Missoula County.46 The ratio obtained was applied to the registered vote
in each precinct to obtain a population estimate for each precinct.
This requires the assumption that the population in each precinct bears
the same relation to that precinct's registered vote as the population
of the county bears to the total registered vote. The assumption is
obviously not totally accurate. What it amounts to is apportionments of
registered voters, not population. The figures are, however, a useful
tool and, indeed, the only ones available.
The figures show the total population of Ward 1 as 3,867, the
smallest of the six wards. Ward 4, the largest, has a population of
4 R.C.M., § 11-701 (1947).
"R.O.M., § 11-707 (1947).
'"Official report to Secretary of State, dated May 15, 1968.
"156 Bureau of Business and Economic Research, University of Montana,Montana
Planning Design Study (1968).
1968]
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5,341. This gives a ratio of 1.53 : 1, well above that permitted by the
Supreme Court for state legislatures. Since there are two members from
each ward, it will take more than fifty percent of the population to
control the council, which is the other test applied by the Supreme
Court.
There is reason to expect that something close to a 1 : 1 ratio
would be required in local apportionments. Since there is nothing
sacred about precincts, small changes can be made to shift any number
of voters necessary. Wards are groups of precincts, and the distribution
can be easily controlled. There is not the same degree of ease in dis-
tricting a state legislature. If county lines are observed, it may be
impossible to reach mathematical exactness, so some latitude has been
allowed.
There will be some difficulty in Montana, even at the local level,
because the precinct lines are determined by the county commissioners
and the city council groups these precincts into wards. The city council
is limited in equalizing its wards by the precincts which the county
commissioners determine.
Even within the precincts set by the county commissioners, Mis-
soula's city council could draw wards much more closely equal in popu-
lation. Absent more authoritative projection of population, the city
council could redistrict on the basis of registered vote to comply with
constitutional and statutory requirements.
The "evils" of malapportionment of a city council are not as
evident as those of state government. The important urban-rural con-
flict is not present. However, the various geographical areas of a city
do have some differing identifiable interests. The balance of political
parties and the strength of a particular type of property holding may
be affected by disproportionate districts. To whatever extent particular
aldermen identify strongly with their wards, their constituents have a
stronger or weaker voice in city government. It is likely that there are
still ward heelers on the American scene.
It seems unlikely that these apportionments will be challanged in
court. The lack of population figures would be a stumbling block in any
litigation. There is no reason, however, why the city councils could not
accomplish the task without being forced to. The benefits may be ill-
defined, but they will be felt in the long run.
VII. CONCLUSION
The extension of the doctrine of one man-one vote to the area of
local government may not be as shattering and disruptive as many people
fear. Only about 25 percent of local government governing boards are
[Vol. 30
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elected from districts, including those with residence requirements. 47
Thus, fewer than 25 percent are subject to the federal requirement.
Under Montana law, the federal ruling adds nothing to present consti-
tutional and statutory requirements, and, in fact, appears less demand-
ing than the Montana law.
County commissioners in Montana seem to be under no federal
obligation to equalize their residence districts, but they should do so
to comply with the Montana Constitution. City councils have a federal
and state obligation to provide wards of equal population. Absent pro-
per population figures, they should apportion on the basis of registered
vote or a projection of registered vote.
It is difficult to assess the ultimate effect of reapportionment on
any particular city. Party representation will depend on the present dis-
tribution of votes and the particular manner in which the new ap-
portionment shifts certain votes. How the newly apportioned body will
vote on given issues will still depend on the particular men elected, what
interests they identify with, and the complex association of interests
and issues. Though it may be some time before the result will be known,
the law has dictated a change.
LEE SIMMONS
"Avery, supra, Footnote 7, 1119.
1968]
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